Bühler stated that a sound can only qualify as a linguistic sign if a three-fold relationship exists connecting the sound to a sender, a receiver, and an object that is being referred to. Parallel to this three-pronged relationship, each linguistic sign (S) has three functions simultaneously:

1. A sign functions as a symptom as it says something about a sender, for example, whether the sender is female or male or what the intention of the utterance is.
2. A sign is a symbol because it refers to objects and states of affairs.
3. A sign serves as a signal because a receiver must interpret it or react to what has been said.

(11)

Speech act theory has had a strong influence on the field of discourse studies as this theory focuses on the question of what people are doing when they use language. Consider the next example. There is a striking difference between the following two sentences.
   (3) It's raining.
   (4) I promise that I will give you one hundred dollars tomorrow.
In (3) a statement is made that may or may not be true. As for (4), however, it is not possible to say that it is true or that it is not true. With verbs such as *to promise* (in the first person), not only is something being said; more importantly, something is being done. In (4) an act is being performed through an utterance. By saying "I promise…", a promise is made. But saying "It's raining" does not make it rain.
      The English philosopher John Austin (1976) used the terms *constative* and *performative* to describe this difference. In constative, such as sentence (3), something is stated about reality; in performatives, such as (4), an act is performed by the utterance itself. (13)

The philosopher John Searle (1969) formulated four *felicity conditions* that illocutions must meet. These four conditions are illustrated below using the illocution *to promise*.

   (5) Felicity conditions for *to promise* (speech act)
      a. the propositional content
         In the case of "promising", the act that the speaker commits himself to (the proposition) must be a future act to be carried out by the speaker himself.
         One cannot make a promise for someone else or promise to do something that has already been done.
      b. the preparatory condition
         The condition concerns those circumstances that are essential for the uptake of an illocution as the intended illocution. In the case of promising, these circumstances would require that the content of the promise is not a matter of course. Another preparatory condition is that the promise must be advantageous to the addressee; One cannot promises something that is solely disadvantageous.
      c. the sincerity condition
         The speaker must honestly be willing to fulfill the promise. Even if he is not willing, he can be held to his promise.

d. the essential condition
   This is the condition that separates the illocution in question from other illocutions. In the case of "promising", this means, among other things, that the speaker takes upon himself the responsibility of carrying out the act stated in the content of the promise.

(15)

This communication model is appealingly uncomplicated, but the process of communication is, in fact, much more complex. There are two major objections that can be put forward. First, nothing can be said about illocutionary force in the sender-message-receiver approach. The message "I'll come tomorrow" can be a promise, a statement, or a threat. If the communication is to be successful, the receiver must not only understand that the "I" in the sentence will be present on the day following the message, but also understand what kind of speech act is being committed. The same gold true for indirect language use. An utterance like "Are you doing anything special tonight?" can, in certain situations, be seen as an invitation. It is left to the receiver to deduce this from the message.
   Second, the model does not take into account the discourse situation in which the communication originated. The situation does, however, play a role in the interpretation of a message . . . . In short, discourse is more than a message from sender to receiver. In fact, sender and receiver are metaphors that obfuscate what is really going on in communication. (41)

Hymes's SPEAKING model

S

S	*Setting*	Time, place, and other physical conditions surrounding the speech act.
	Scene	The psychological counterpart to setting. What is meant here is that a setting can be changed for example, from formal to informal, by the participants.
P	Participants	The *speaker* or sender, the *Addresser*, the *Hearer*, Receiver or Audience, and the *Addressee*.
E	Ends	The *Purpose — outcome* and *Purpose — goals*.
A	Act Sequences	The *Form* and the *Content* of the message.
K	*Keys*	The tone of the conversation, for example, serious or mocking.
I	Instrumentalities	The *Channels*; written, telegraph, etc., and the *Forms of Speech*; dialect, standard language, etc.
N	Norms	The *Norms of Interaction*, e.g., interruption and *Norms of Interpretation*, for example, how a listener's suddenly looking away must be interpreted.

G	*Genres*	Fairy tale, advertisement, etc.

(44)

Robert de Beaugrande (1981), one of the grand old men in discourse studies, has formulated seven criteria for textuality, that is, criteria that a sequence of sentence must meet in order to qualify as a discourse.

a. *Cohesion* is the connection that results when the interpretation of a textual element is dependent on another element in the text.

b. *Coherence* is the connection that is brought about by something outside the text. This "something" is usually knowledge which a listener or reader is assumed to have.

c. *Intentionality* means that writers and speakers must have the conscious intention of achieving specific goals with their message, for instance, conveying information or arguing an opinion . . . When no intention is assigned, the word sequence becomes the equivalent of a page of random words not unlike the penmanship practice of elementary school pupils.

d. *Acceptability* requires that a sequence of sentences be acceptable to the intended audience in order to qualify as a text.

e. *Informativeness* is necessary in discourse. A discourse must contain new information. If a reader knows everything contained in a discourse, then it does not qualify. Likewise, if a reader does not understand what is in a discourse, it also does not qualify as a discourse.

f. *Situationality* is essential to textuality. So, it is important to consider the situation in which the discourse has been produced and dealt with.

g. *Intertextuality* means that a sequence of sentence is related by form or meaning to other sequences of sentences.

(49-50)

The most salient phenomenon of discourse is the fact that sentences or utterances are linked together. For this "connectedness", this "texture", two concepts are used: *Cohesion*, referring to the connections which have their manifestation in the discourse itself, and *coherence*, referring to the connections which can be made by the reader or listener based on knowledge outside the discourse. In a sentence like "Mary got pregnant and she married" the fact that *she* refers to *Mary* is and example of cohesion, and the interpretation that her pregnancy was the reason for her to marry is an example of coherence. (103)

Michael Halliday and Ruquaiya Hassan (1976) . . . were the first to analyze this kind of discourse connection. They distinguished five types of cohesion.

a. *Substitution*
Substitution is the replacement of a word(group) or sentence segment by a "dummy" word. The

reader or listener can fill in the correct element based on the preceding. Three frequently occurring types of substitution are that of a noun (1), of a verb (2) and for a clause (3).

> (1) These biscuits are stale. Get some fresh *ones*.
> (2) A: Have you called the doctor?
> B: I haven't *done* it yet, but I will *do* it.
> A: Though actually, I think you should *do* it.
> (3) A: Are they still arguing in there?
> B: No, *it* just seems so.

b. *Ellipsis*

Ellipsis is the omission of a word or part of a sentence. Ellipsis is closely related to substitution, and can be described as "substitution by zero". The division that is normally used is nominal, verbal and clausal ellipsis.

> (4) These biscuits are stale. Those are fresh.
> (5) He participated in the debate, but you didn't.
> (6) Who wants to go shopping? You?

c. *Reference*

Reference concerns the relation between a discourse element and a preceding or following element. Reference deals with a semantic relationship whereas substitution and ellipsis deal with the relationship between grammatical units: words, sentence parts and clauses. In the case of reference, the meaning of a dummy word can be determined by what is imparted before or after the occurrence of the dummy word. In general, the dummy word is a pronoun.

> (7) I see John is here. *He* hasn't changed a bit.
> (8) *She* certainly has changed. No, behind John. I mean Karin.

But reference can also be achieved by other means, for instance, by the use of a definite article or and adverb, as in the following examples:

> (9) A man crossed the street. Nobody saw what happened. Suddenly *the* man was lying there and calling for help.
> (10) We grew up in the 1960s. We were idealistic *then*.

d. *Conjunction*

Conjunction is the relationship which indicates how the subsequent sentence or clause should be linked to the preceding or the following (parts of the) sentence. This is usually achieved by the use of conjunctions (also known as connectives). The following are examples of three frequently occurring relationships; addition, temporality, causality. The relationship can be hypotactic (as in the a-examples, which combine a main clause with a subordinate clause or phrase) or paratactic (as in the b-examples, which have two main clauses).

> Addition
> (11) a. *Besides* being mean, he is also hateful.
> b. He no longer goes to school *and* is planning to look for a job.
> Temporality
> (12) a. *After* the car had been repaired, we were able to continue our journey.
> b. The car was repaired. *Afterwards* we were able to continue our journey.
> Causality
> (13) a. He is not going to school today *because* he is sick.
> b. Ann got a beautiful job last year *and* now she is rich.

e. *Lexical cohesion*
Lexical cohesion refers to the links between the content words (nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs) which are used in subsequent segments of discourse. Two types of lexical cohesion can be distinguished: reiteration and collocation.

　　　Reiteration includes not only repetition but also synonymy. Reiteration can also occur through the use of a word that is systematically linked to a previous one, for example, *young* and *old*. In general reiteration is divided into the five following types.
　　　1. Repetition (often involving reference)
　　　2. Synonymy (often involving reference)
　　　3. Hyponymy/Hyperonymy (e.g., the relation of *flower* to *tulip* and vice versa, subordination
　　　　and superordination)
　　　4. Meronymy (part vs. whole)
　　　5. Antonymy (e.g. *white* vs. *black*)

　　　Collocation, the second type of lexical cohesion, deals with the relationship between words on the basis of the fact that these often occur in the same surroundings. Some examples are *sheep* and *wool*, *congress* and *politician* or *college* and *study*. (103-105)

A special subset of pragmatic relations is rhetorical relations. these are the relations with which speakers or writers apparently have the intention of bringing about a change in opinion, position or behavior of readers or listeners. Usually the five following rhetorical relations are distinguished.
　　　(47) Evidence
　　　　　No single measure has had an effect. The traffic jams are till as bad as ever.
　　　(48) Conclusion
　　　　　The window is open. There must have been a burglar.
　　　(49) Justification
　　　　　Now I am throwing in the towel. I've tried in ten times.
　　　(50) Solution
　　　　　No single measure has had an effect. With this proposal our goals will be achieved.
　　　(51) Motivation
　　　　　Do you want to know more? Send us a stamped self-addressed envelope.
(110)

Some elements in stylistic research

Level	Feature
Content	number and sore of topics, propositional density, number of elaborations
Discourse structure	paragraph length, introduction, conclusion, rhetorical relations, argument structure
Syntax	sentence length, variation in sentence length, sentence initial structure, number of relative clauses, sub- and coordination, passive voice, cleft constructions, nominalizations

Lexicon	word length, lexical diversity (type-token ratio), frequencies and ratios of various parts of speech (adverbs, qualifiers, function words, etc.), hapax legomena (words occurring only once), impersonal constructions, figures of speech
Usage	frequencies of characters, punctuation marks, spelling errors

(153)